Going Dark
The phrase behind a decade of policy argument. "Going Dark" is the gap between what a court can authorize and what a network can actually deliver — and it is the gap a Trusted Third Party exists to close, one order at a time.
Going Dark — law enforcement's capability gap in lawful surveillance
"Going Dark" is a law enforcement initiative to address the gap between the legal authority and the practical ability of law enforcement to conduct lawfully authorized electronic surveillance. The problems it highlights include difficulty receiving information from some technology companies, and the use by criminals of advanced technologies and techniques that complicate the execution of court orders for electronic surveillance.
Two source documents are hosted here: the FBI's briefing on the problem, and the record of the February 17, 2011 hearing before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, "Going Dark: Lawful Electronic Surveillance in the Face of New Technologies." Both predate the encryption debates of the following decade, and both are still the clearest statement of the underlying problem: the law kept pace; the capability did not.
Subsentio's view is practical rather than political. Whatever the policy outcome, a carrier served with a valid order has to be able to execute it. That capability — provisioning, mediation to the ATIS or ETSI delivery standard, secure delivery, the record — is what the company operates, and it is the part of "Going Dark" a provider can actually do something about.
The parts that matter to a provider.
The gap
Authority without capability. A court order is only as good as the network's ability to isolate and deliver what it names.
The FBI briefing
The FBI's statement of the problem: services and technologies that have no lawful-intercept capability, or whose providers cannot respond in time.
The 2011 hearing
Testimony and questions from the House Judiciary Subcommittee on what, if anything, should change in the law to keep pace with technology.
Where a TTP fits
Most of the gap on a carrier's own network is not a policy problem. It is a provisioning, mediation and delivery problem — the work a Trusted Third Party carries.
Does this apply to you?
Every provider that could be served with an order it cannot execute. The policy debate is about encryption and platforms; the operational question is whether your own network can deliver what a court authorizes.
FBI: Going Dark
Hosted in full by Subsentio. Opens in a new tab.
Other primary documents.
CALEA Act of 1994
What CALEA (1994) requires, section by section — definitions, capability, security, safe harbor, enforcement — with the full text to download.
CALEA Broadband Coverage Order (2005)
The 2005 FCC order that extended CALEA to facilities-based broadband and interconnected VoIP providers — what it decided, why, and what it left open.
CALEA Capability Order (2006)
The 2006 FCC order that set the May 14, 2007 deadline, permitted Trusted Third Parties, required SSI filings and monitoring reports, and settled who pays.
ECPA (1986)
What ECPA did: extended the Wiretap Act to electronic communications and created the Pen Register Act and the Stored Communications Act — the tiers of process.
The Wiretap Act (1968)
The 1968 statute behind every Title III order: a general prohibition on intercepting communications, with a court-supervised exception on probable cause.
FISA (1978)
What FISA authorizes — foreign-intelligence surveillance of foreign powers and their agents under the FISA court — and what a FISA order means for a carrier.